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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates individuals’ ability to avoid investment mistakes and analyzes how 
investment competence is related to the propensity to seek or rely on professional advice. To 
address these issues, we use novel survey data collected from a representative sample of Swiss 
households. We find that investment competence is characterized by significant age and gender 
gaps, and that individuals who rely less on price movements as a source of information about 
investments are more likely to show above-the-average investment competence. We also find that 
individuals with relatively extensive investment experience and those who rely relatively strongly 
on their own judgment in making investment decisions are more likely to make investment 
decisions autonomously. In addition, we find that investment competence is positively related to 
the demand for financial advice. Thus, it appears that the individuals who most need financial 
advice are those who are least likely to seek such advice and rely on it.  
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1 Introduction 
A compelling body of research documents that households make serious investment mistakes. Among the 
various pieces of evidence are findings that households hold under-diversified portfolios (Blume and 
Friend, 1975; Kelly, 1995; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008) and exhibit a strong preference for local and 
home country stocks (Huberman, 2001; Calvet et al., 2007). In addition, households trade too much 
(Odean, 1999), sell winners too early and hold losers too long (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998), 
and they tend to buy a stock simply because it catches their attention (Barber and Odean, 2008). As a 
result, the average retail investor tends to underperform the market (Barber et al., 2009). 
One might argue that an inability to avoid investment mistakes will not necessarily generate poor 
financial outcomes for households. At least in principle, households with low investment competence 
could seek help from qualified financial advisors. In fact, the regulation of financial advisors relies, to a 
large extent, on the assumption that these advisors are mainly consulted by unsophisticated investors in 
need of help. However, regulatory protective measures can be effective only if households with limited 
investment competence seek the support of professional advisors. Otherwise, financial advice cannot 
serve as a substitute for investment competence, and regulatory measures will not benefit those who need 
them the most. 
In this paper, we analyze whether individuals in Switzerland are at risk of making investment mistakes 
and whether they are inclined to seek help from professional advisors. To assess individuals’ competence 
in avoiding investment mistakes, we conducted an online survey that consisted of questions that address 
common errors documented in the empirical literature on behavioral and household finance. We analyze 
the determinants of investment mistakes and assess how an individual’s degree of investment competence 
affects whether he or she makes investment decisions autonomously, consults a professional advisor or 
delegates investment decisions to a potential advisor. We obtain several interesting findings. We find that 
respondents differ in their investment competence significantly by their age and gender: younger, female 
respondents show significantly lower investment competence than the other respondents. We also find 
that a greater reliance on price movements as a source of information about investments increases the 
probability that a person shows below-the-average investment competence. We find that individuals with 
substantial investment experience, who rely strongly on their own judgment, are more likely to make 
investment decisions autonomously than to seek and rely on advice. However, we also observe that the 
demand for financial advice is positively related to investment competence: investors who are less able to 
avoid investment errors are more likely to make investment decisions autonomously, whereas investors 
with higher investment competence are more likely to delegate decisions to an advisor. Overall, our 
results suggest that advisory services are not a substitute for the ability to avoid investment mistakes and 
that supply-side solutions imposed by regulators to protect financial customers may not benefit those who 
need them the most. 
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Our results contribute to the discussion of the drivers of investment mistakes and the role of financial 
advice as a potential remedy for such errors. They also generate suggestions regarding potentially helpful 
educational initiatives. Although we use hypothetical questions to assess individuals’ decision behavior, 
we find that some often-cited errors, such under-diversification and mistakes arising from the disposition 
effect, are influenced by the same factors as those identified in studies based on transaction data. 
Additionally, by providing hypothetical choices, we can address the reasoning used in investment 
decisions: reasoning that is not directly observable in research based on transaction data. By extending the 
definition of investment competence, we confirm the positive relationship between investment 
competence and the propensity to delegate decisions, as suggested by studies focused primarily on the 
importance of financial knowledge. On this basis, we suggest that educational initiatives may indeed be 
beneficial but that such initiatives should educate retail investors about how to avoid behavioral traps in 
addition to teaching them basic financial knowledge. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the literature related to our 
research questions. In Section 3, we describe the data, provide descriptive statistics, explain how we 
assess investment competence and describe the motivation for our choice of control variables. Section 4 
presents and elaborates the results and discusses endogeneity issues. The results of robustness tests are 
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes our findings and concludes the paper.   
2 Related Literature 
Many households make decisions that are hard to reconcile with rational decision-making (see, e.g., 
Bondt, 1998, Campbell, 2006 or Barber and Odean, 2011 for comprehensive reviews), and a growing 
body of empirical literature identifies a cross-sectional correlation between particular investment mistakes 
and individual characteristics. For example, Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) and Calvet et al. (2007) find 
that richer, better-educated households tend to be better diversified. Dhar and Zhu (2006) document that 
trading experience reduces the disposition effect, i.e., the tendency to hold losing stocks and sell winning 
stocks. Similarly, Feng and Seasholes (2005) find that investment experience eliminates reluctance to 
realize losses. Examining under-diversification, inertia in risk taking and the disposition effect, Calvet et 
al. (2009) build an index of financial sophistication and find that the latter increases with financial wealth, 
household size, education and proxies for financial experience. These and other related individual 
characteristics are often used as proxies for investor sophistication.  
Decisions that violate the concept of rational decision-making are costly. Empirical studies suggest that 
the magnitude of negative abnormal returns ranges from 0.7% (French, 2008) to 3.7% per year (Barber 
and Odean, 2000). Consequently, a number of potential remedies have been proposed as a means to 
lessen such investment errors. For example, Thaler and Bernarzi (2004) show that participation in 
retirement plans as a default option has a substantial positive effect on retirement savings. Collins (2010) 
suggests that financial counseling can help individuals develop better financial practices, thus improving 
 4 
their long-term financial security. The question of whether expert financial advice truly benefits retail 
investors is still under debate, but there is a consensus that financial advice may improve retail investors’ 
portfolio decisions when conflicts of interests are minimized (Bhattacharya et al., 2012). There is 
evidence that professionally managed portfolios are better diversified (Gerhardt and Hackethal, 2009) and 
show a weaker disposition effect than portfolios of retail investors (Shapira and Venezia, 2001).  
To date, the question of whether financial advice is a sufficient remedy for inferior decision-making has 
focused mainly on widespread financial illiteracy as a source of adverse decisions.1 One strand of the 
literature documents a negative relationship between financial literacy and advice seeking, suggesting that 
those with lower levels of financial literacy are more inclined to make use of financial advice. For 
example, Hackethal et al. (2010) study the behavior of German retail investors and conclude that 
customers with less interest in and knowledge about financial matters are more likely than others to rely 
on advice. In a portfolio-choice experiment, Hung and Yoong (2010) find that individuals with low 
financial literacy (both self-assessed and measured) choose to take advice more often than others do. 
Frederick (2005) shows that individuals with lower levels of cognitive skills are more risk-averse, and 
both Bluethgen et al. (2008) and Gerhardt and Hackethal (2009) find that greater risk aversion increases 
the demand for financial advice. Kramer (2012) finds that banking clients who view themselves as less 
financially literate than others are more likely to ask for expert financial assistance. Additionally, 
Hackethal et al. (2010) find that less sophisticated customers are less aware of the problem of conflicts of 
interest among financial advisors and therefore are more inclined to consult and follow the advice of 
advisors. Hence, financial advice can serve as a substitute for a perceived or measured lack of financial 
sophistication. 
Other studies, however, suggest exactly the opposite relationship between investment competence and the 
demand for financial advice, arguing that more sophisticated individuals are more likely to seek advice.  
One possible reason for this variation may be the incentives of advisors to reveal information to investors 
with different levels of sophistication. For example, Collins (2010), Calcagno and Monticone (2011) and 
Bucher-Koenen and Koenen (2011) suggest that advisors reveal information only to more knowledgeable 
clients, anticipating that such clients are more likely to consult advisors. Another possible reason for a 
positive relationship between financial sophistication and advice seeking may be the marginal costs of 
information acquisition and processing. If time spent with an advisor is perceived as a fixed cost, then 
highly sophisticated investors will face lower marginal costs of information processing than will investors 
with less sophistication, which will motivate the sophisticated investors to consume more advisory 
services (Bluethgen et al., 2008).  
Various studies have confirmed the marginal benefits argument using different measures of investor 
sophistication. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) find that people with higher scores on financial literacy 
questions are more likely than less sophisticated investors to rely on financial experts when planning their 
                                                      
1 Kramer (2012), in addition, considers cognitive ability but fails to find a significant effect on advice seeking. 
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retirement. Using past portfolio performance as a proxy for financial sophistication, Bluethgen et al. 
(2008) find that wealthier, more sophisticated and more experienced clients are more likely to seek 
advice. Hackethal et al. (2012) confirm the effect of investment experience and wealth on the propensity 
to seek advice and suggest that the effect could also be related to the higher opportunity costs associated 
with time among wealthier, more experienced investors. Further support for the conjecture that less 
sophisticated individuals rely less on expert financial advice than others can be found in the psychology 
literature. Kruger and Dunning (1999), for example, observe that incompetence robs people of awareness 
of their own incompetence because such individuals lack the capacity to distinguish appropriate decisions 
from errors. As a result, such individuals fail to seek better information. 
3 Data Description 
3.1 The Sample 
Our dataset comes from an online survey that was conducted in December 2010 with 1,016 individuals 
from the German-, Italian-, and French-speaking regions of Switzerland. Switzerland is a particularly 
suitable country for studies of investment competence for several reasons. First, Swiss households are 
better endowed with resources that allow them to engage in investment activities than are households in 
other countries. According to OECD data, Swiss households have the highest net saving rate as a percent 
of disposable income (12% compared to 4% in the US),2 and in terms of per capita assets, Swiss 
households are the richest in the world.3 Second, compared to households in other European countries, 
households in Switzerland exhibit more independence in planning and managing the financial 
components of their retirement. Hence, the social costs of investment mistakes in such households’ 
attempts to manage their savings for retirement may be high. Third, the multicultural character of 
Switzerland makes it possible to examine a magnitude of cultural effects on households’ investment 
decision behavior, advice seeking and delegation. 
The participants in our survey were recruited from a pool of individuals provided by a professional 
market research agency in Switzerland. The agency has experience conducting surveys on financial 
topics. The participants were informed of the purpose of the study and of the affiliation of the authors. 
Additionally, in exchange for their participation, the individuals answering most of the questions took 
part in a raffle in which an iPad was awarded to the winner.4 The questions were originally written in 
German. We used professional interpreters who were provided by the market research agency to translate 
the questions into French and Italian.  
                                                      
2 See OECD (2012), Annex Table 23, p. 255. 
3 See Allianz (2011), Appendix B, p. 90. 
4 Compensation type did not have a significant impact on the respondents’ answers. In particular, we found that a fixed payment 
(10 Swiss francs) did not motivate students to answer the questions differently than a chance of winning an iPad with a market 
value of approximately 800 Swiss francs that was raffled off among 100 participants. 
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The sample is representative of the underlying population in terms of age, gender and geographic 
location. As Table 1 shows, the respondents were 48 years old on average. 54% were male, 30% had 
degrees from schools of applied sciences (“Hochschule”) and 18% had university degrees. Overall, 43% 
of the respondents stated that their annual disposable income was between 50,000 and 100,000 Swiss 
francs (USD 48,500 and USD 97,000 as of December 2010);5 only 9% stated their annual income as less 
than 50,000 Swiss francs. Notably, 37% estimated the value of their wealth (including savings and 
financial investments) to be above 100,000 Swiss francs.   
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 mean st. dev. min. max. Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics 
female 46% 0.50   income:     
<50'000 Swiss francs 9% 0.29   50'000-100'000 Swiss francs 44% 0.50   100'000-150'000 Swiss francs 44% 0.50   >150'000 2% 0.15   wealth     
<100'00 Swiss francs 59% 0.49   100'000-200'000 Swiss francs 18% 0.39   200'000-300'000 Swiss francs 7% 0.25   >300'000 Swiss francs 3% 0.18   self-employment 10% 0.30   education level:     
primary school 7% 0.25   secondary school 34% 0.48   grammar school 10% 0.30   school of applied sciences 31% 0.46   university 18% 0.38   residence:     
German-speaking 70% 0.46   French-speaking 20% 0.40   Italian-speaking 10% 0.30   age 48 0.12 25 69 
<=30 years 7% 0.26   31-40 years 21% 0.41   41-50 years 30% 0.46   51-60 years 22% 0.41   61-69 years 20% 0.40   household size 2.6 1.31 1 5 
     
Investment Experience and Importance of Information Sources 
investment experience:     
Swiss bonds 2.03 0.96 1 4 
bonds world 1.59 0.82 1 4 
Swiss equity 2.09 1.00 1 4 
equity world 1.70 0.89 1 4 
alternative investments 1.76 0.91 1 4 
perceived importance of information sources:     
price movements 2.04 0.79 1 3 
media news 1.90 0.65 1 3 
friend's opinion 1.79 0.66 1 3 
own judgment 2.33 0.64 1 3 
advisor's opinion 2.05 0.68 1 3 
opinion of several advisors 1.80 0.70 1 3 
 
3.2 Assessing Investment Competence 
The main body of the survey contains questions that aim to evaluate individuals’ ability to avoid 
investment mistakes. An investment mistake is a decision that is not recommended or wise based on 
                                                      
5 The average annual disposable income per household in 2010 was 81,900 Swiss francs (USD 78,600 as of Dec. 2010). Source: 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/20/02/blank/key/einkommen0/niveau.html 
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theoretical or empirical considerations. We refer to the ability to avoid investment mistakes as investment 
competence.  
Generally, investment mistakes can result from a lack of specific knowledge or an inability to apply such 
knowledge effectively. For example, Dhar and Zhu (2006) find that individuals with better financial 
literacy are more likely to avoid suboptimal portfolio decisions, such as those associated with the 
disposition effect. The inability to apply knowledge effectively can be driven by emotions or cognitive 
errors in the selection and processing of information, as suggested by the vast body of research on 
behavioral biases (see, for example, the surveys cited above). 
To evaluate the investment competence of the respondents, we invited them to answer a set of multiple-
choice questions whose potential answers were designed to illustrate biased decision behavior. Because 
we provided multiple answers, the respondents were able to compare them and choose the best 
alternative. The participants could also skip questions or choose the “don’t know” option. The appendix 
provides an English version of the investment competence questions and their motivation. 
Table 2 shows how the participants answered our investment competence questions, the percentage of 
participants who answered the questions incorrectly and the distribution of the incorrect answers. 
Table 2: Investment Mistakes 
The table shows the distribution of answers to the investment competence questions. The marked cells show the percentage of 
individuals that we consider as able to avoid mistakes. The lower part of the table shows the number of investment mistakes 
and its probability distribution. The questions and the possible answers are included in the appendix. 
 
 a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) NA Participants with investment mistakes 
Q1: past returns 2% 29% 12% 26% 24% 3% 2% 1% 1% 75% 
Q2: past risks 3% 2% 3% 5% 42% 7% 33% 3% 2% 56% 
Q3: performance drivers 76% 6% 17%      1% 23% 
Q4: diversification 17% 52% 29%      2% 69% 
Q5: risk for losses in the long-term 10% 59% 29%      2% 10% 
Q6: investing on a random walk 40% 57%       3% 57% 
Q7: reasons for continuing investing 14% 20% 34% 31%     1% 34% 
Q8: attractiveness of large unlikely payoffs 70% 8% 20%      2% 8% 
Q9: risk-taking after losses 1% 4% 36% 37% 22%    1% 5% 
Q10: behavior after losses 11% 3% 39% 46%     1% 53% 
Q11: behavior after gains 58% 9% 31%      2% 67% 
Number of mistakes 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Frequency 4 17 47 136 219 221 178 78 18 8 0 0 
Cumulative Prob. Distribution 0.4% 2.3% 7.3% 22.0% 45.7% 69.5% 88.7% 97.2% 99.1% 100%   
 
The respondents made the most errors in recalling and comparing the past returns of asset classes (Q1), 
deciding how many assets are needed for diversification (Q4) and assessing the attractiveness of assets 
with large but unlikely payoffs (Q8). Participants made the fewest mistakes in deciding whether to take 
risks after losses (Q9), judging the probability of losses from long-term investments (Q5) and comparing 
the importance of different performance drivers (Q3). Overall, 50% of the participants answered between 
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four and five questions incorrectly, 0.4% (4 individuals) made no mistakes and 0.9% (8 individuals) 
answered 9 of 11 questions incorrectly, providing the highest number of incorrect answers in the group. 
Notably, 9% failed to answer at least one question.  
Investment mistakes themselves are only weakly correlated across individuals (see Table 3). The only 
exception is indicated by the answers to the last two questions, which were designed to assess the 
disposition effect, i.e., the propensity to hold losers too long (Q10) and sell winners too early (Q11).  
Table 3: Correlation Between Investment Mistakes 
The table reports the tetrachoric correlations between the bivariate variables evaluating the answers to the investment competence 
questions. 
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Q2 -0.327 
         Q3 0.126 -0.095
        Q4 0.190 -0.044 0.053
       Q5 0.167 -0.121 0.043 -0.126
      Q6 0.105 -0.030 -0.027 -0.035 -0.034
     Q7 0.050 -0.109 0.063 0.087 -0.054 0.074
    Q8 0.176 0.008 0.063 0.103 0.056 -0.028 0.226
   Q9 0.005 0.096 0.079 0.097 0.099 -0.050 0.252 0.293
  Q10 0.114 -0.094 -0.059 0.122 0.092 -0.068 0.223 0.119 0.282
 Q11 0.080 -0.124 0.024 0.109 -0.007 0.184 0.199 0.013 0.012 0.526
 
One method of measuring an individual’s overall ability to avoid investment mistakes involves 
computing the fraction of incorrect answers. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that each 
question receives the same weight even though the degree of discrepancy between the incorrect and 
correct answers differs from question to question (see Table 2). Essentially, the questions may differ in 
their difficulty levels and in their degree of precision. For this reason, we developed a measure based on a 
weighting scheme that considers both issues.6  
We define the index of investment competence for individual ! as a weighted sum of investment mistakes, 
i.e. !! = −(!!!! + !!!! +⋯+ !!!!) 
where  !!! = 1   if ! !!is an inferior answer7    0   otherwise                                ! 
and  0 ≤ !! ≤ 1 is a weight that reflects the difficulty respectively the precision of question !. The 
weight of question ! is defined as !! = 1 − ! !!  
                                                      
6 The weighting scheme is the first step of the PRIDIT scoring method devised by Brockett et al. (2002), who use it to assess 
insurance fraud based on several indicator variables. In the second step, a principle component analysis is used to analyze the 
rescaled responses. Lusardi et al. (2012) used this method to assess financial literacy among the elderly in the U.S. We do not 
employ the second step because the responses to our investment competence questions show little correlation (see Table 3). 
7 “Don’t know” answers are treated as no mistakes.  
 9 
where ! .  is the mean or the percentage of participants who answer question ! incorrectly. The weight !! applies a higher (lower) penalty to a question when a larger proportion of the participants answered 
the question correctly (incorrectly). 
3.3 Investment Competence Drivers 
The literature on the cross-sectional relationship between investment mistakes and household 
characteristics suggests that households with greater financial wealth, better education and more 
investment experience tend to make fewer investment errors (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008; Calvet et al., 
2007; Calvet et al., 2007; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Calvet et al., 2009). Our proxy 
for financial experience is self-assessed investment experience. We asked the participants to evaluate 
their own investment experience in five asset classes (Swiss bonds, Swiss equities, international equities, 
international bonds and alternative investments) on a scale with four levels. Table 1 provides the 
summary statistics. The participants in our sample show the most experience with Swiss equities and 
Swiss bonds and the least experience with non-Swiss bonds and non-Swiss equities.  
In Table 4, we report the polychoric correlations between the participants’ levels of experience in 
different asset classes.8 We observe a high correlation between experience with Swiss bonds and 
international bonds and between experience with Swiss equities and international equities. Participants 
who indicate high (low) levels of experience with international equities are also more likely to have high 
(low) levels of experience with alternative investments. 
Table 4: Correlation Between Statements on Investment Experience 
The table reports polychoric correlations between experience statements across asset classes. The experience statements are 
ordinal variables taking values between 1 (no experience) and 4 (a lot of experience).  
 
 Swiss bonds bonds world Swiss equity equity world 
bonds world 0.77    
Swiss equity 0.67 0.70   
equity world 0.54 0.75 0.81  
alternative investments 0.43 0.48 0.51 0.53 
 
To determine the correlations between investment experience and different asset classes, we use principle 
component analysis to build an index of investment experience.9 The standardized loadings of the 
variables based on their correlation matrix are provided in Table 5.10 With the first principle component 
used to measure investment experience, we can explain 70% of the variance in the variables. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.89, which indicates the high reliability of the variables used. 
 
                                                      
8 The polychoric correlations estimate what the correlation between households would be if ratings were made on a continuous 
scale. Theoretically, these correlations are invariant to changes in the number of rating categories. 
9 Our main results are not sensitive to alternative measures, such as a simple sum of experience statements (from 1 to 4) 
regarding equities (Swiss and international) and bonds (Swiss and international).  
10 The standardized loadings are based on the polychoric correlations reported in Table 4. 
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Table 5: Standartized Loadings 
The table reports results of principal component analysis applied on the experience statements with different asset classes based 
upon the polychoric correlations. The standardized loadings of the first component are used to form an index of investment 
experience.  
 
 1. component 2. component 3. component 
Explained variance 0.704 0.128 0.094 
 standardized loadings explained variance reliability by dropping 
Swiss bonds 0.82 0.67 0.87 
Bonds world 0.90 0.80 0.85 
Swiss equity 0.89 0.80 0.85 
Equity world 0.88 0.77 0.85 
Alternative investments 0.68 0.46 0.91 
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.89   
 
Furthermore, we hypothesize relationships between an individual’s views about the importance of 
specific sources of information and the probability of two decision types: making certain types of 
investment mistakes and seeking financial advice. To assess these relationships, we ask the participants to 
judge the importance of the following information sources on a three-point scale that includes the 
categories “not important,” “important” and “very important”: price movements, news in the media, own 
judgment, opinions of friends, opinions of one’s advisor and opinions of many advisors. For the 
participants in our sample, the most important source of information was one’s own opinions, followed 
by price movements and the opinions of one’s advisor (see Table 1). The correlation between the 
perceived importance of various information sources is low (0.01) to mediocre (0.55) (see Table 6). For 
this reason, we do not apply further transformations to these data. 
Table 6: Correlation Between Information Sources 
The table reports polychoric correlations between statements on the perceived importance of information sources. The statements 
are ordinal variables taking values between 1 (not important) and 3 (very important).  
 
 price movements news in media friends’ opinion own judgment opinion own advisor 
price movements      
news in media 0.468     
friends’ opinion -0.051 0.165    
own judgment 0.391 0.326 0.269   
opinion own advisor 0.079 0.094 0.132 0.022  
opinion many advisors 0.229 0.140 0.207 0.011 0.554 
 
3.4 Demand for Financial Advice 
Financial advisors can be endowed with decision-making authority or can play a purely advisory role. 
Swiss banks offer both options only to wealthy individuals11, but some independent advisors offer 
advisory services to less wealthy individuals as well. Because participants may not have an advisor, we 
ask that they consider a potential financial advisor (at a bank or not) and then choose the option that best 
                                                      
11 Banks differ in their definition of a wealthy client, but on the website www.assetinum.com, Swiss private clients with at least 
50,000 Swiss francs can contact one or many advisors from different banks. For a choice of up to five advisors, the contact 
service is free. 
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describes their current attitude toward acquiring and relying on advice from such an advisor. The 
distribution of answers is summarized in Table 7.   
Table 7: Demand for Financial Advice 
Which of the following statements describes best your willingness to delegate financial decisions to a potential 
advisor? 
 
d1: I prefer to decide autonomously, the advisor should only execute my decisions 23% 
d2: I prefer to tell my advisor how I would decide and would ask for his opinion 25% 
d3: I prefer to get several opinions before I decide 35% 
d4: I would trust my advisor in most decisions 14% 
d5: I would let my advisor decide everything 1% 
Non participation 2% 
 
22% of the participants state that they prefer to make investment decisions autonomously, 60% would 
consult one or several advisors before they decide, and 15% would rely largely or completely on an 
advisor. Calcagno and Monticone (2011) asked a similar question of banking clients in Italy in 2007. Of 
the clients who participated in the survey, 12% indicated that they make their decisions autonomously. 
The higher percentage of self-directed individuals in our sample (22%) could be a function of the 
participants’ age. In our sample, 56% of the participants are less than 50 years old, whereas the 
percentage of banking clients under 50 in the sample of Calcagno and Monticone (2011) is 38%. Some 
studies provide evidence that younger individuals are more likely to make investment decisions 
autonomously (Bluethgen et al., 2008; Hackethal et al., 2010; Kelly, 1995; Bhattacharya et al., 2012). The 
results that we report in Section 4.2 support this finding. 
To avoid estimation difficulties that can result from the use of too few observations in a given category, 
we pool participants who are willing to delegate all decisions (d5) with those who are willing to delegate 
most decisions (d4). As a result, we obtain a dependent variable with four categories (d1, d2, d3 and d4).  
3.5 Advice Seeking and Individuals’ Characteristics 
Most studies on advice seeking find that the demand for advisory services increases with wealth 
(Bluethgen et al., 2008; Guiso and Jappelli, 2006; Calcagno and Monticone, 2011; Bluethgen et al., 2008; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2012). Some studies also find that older individuals are also significantly more likely 
to seek advice than are younger individuals (Bluethgen et al., 2008; Hackethal et al., 2010; Kelly, 1995; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2012). The effect of gender and those of experience, self-employment and education 
 12 
as proxies for the opportunity cost of time, are ambiguous.12  Based on these findings, we include the 
following variables as controls in the multivariate analysis: age, gender, education level, income, wealth, 
investment experience, and self-employment status. Additionally, we control for cultural differences 
based on the linguistic regions of the participants. 
4 Results 
4.1 Drivers of Investment Mistakes 
In this section, we analyze whether the probability of certain investment mistakes and a person’s level of 
investment competence are related to the perceived importance of specific information sources, stated 
investment experience and various demographic and socio-economic variables. Table 8 reports the 
marginal effects of logistic regressions on the probability of observing specific investment errors where 
investment errors are represented by the binomial variables !!  for ! = 1,… ,11.  
 
  
                                                      
12 Whereas Guiso and Jappelli (2006), Calcagno and Monticone (2011), Bluethgen et al. (2008), Hackethal et al. (2012) and 
Kelly (1995) find that males have a lower propensity to delegate, Bhattacharya et al. (2012) find that males are more likely to 
obtain advice, and Hackethal et al. (2010) find that males and females do not differ significantly in their willingness to rely on 
advice. Additionally, Hackethal et al. (2012) find that advised clients are more likely to be self-employed and tend to be more 
experienced. However, Calcagno and Monticone (2011) find that experience does not significantly influence advice seeking, and 
Kramer (2012) does not find any significant effect of self-employment on the demand for financial advice among Dutch retail 
clients. Elmerick et al. (2002) find that for US households, self-employment is negatively related to the likelihood of using a 
financial planner in saving and investment decisions. They also find that this likelihood increases with educational achievement. 
However, Calcagno and Monticone (2011) and Hackethal et al. (2010) find that better-educated investors are less likely to 
delegate and are more likely to make investment decisions on their own.  
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Table 8: Drivers of Single Investment Mistakes 
The table reports marginal effects on the probability to make investment mistakes in answering investment competence questions after estimating 
logistic regressions. The dependent variables in the logistic regressions are bivariate variables taking the value of 1 if the choice is inferior. The 
explanatory variables are described in the appendix. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are denoted with stars: 
*** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. 
 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 disposition effect 
price movements -0.034 -0.033 0.02 -0.032 -0.022 0.059** 0.038 0.002 -0.008 0.062** 0.038 0.05** 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.025) (0.016) (0.027) (0.026) (0.014) (0.01) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) 
news in media -0.041* 0.017 -0.008 -0.039 -0.001 0.078*** 0.013 -0.019 0.005 0.017 0.052* -0.004 
 (0.024) (0.03) (0.024) (0.027) (0.018) (0.03) (0.028) (0.016) (0.011) (0.03) (0.028) (0.027) 
friends’ opinion 0.077*** -0.023 0.023 0.072*** 0.016 -0.036 -0.019 -0.009 -0.003 -0.049* -0.028 0.023 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.027) (0.017) (0.029) (0.027) (0.015) (0.011) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) 
own judgment -0.001 0.032 -0.035 -0.082*** 0.021 0.059* 0.013 -0.017 0.018 0.028 0.023 -0.009 
 (0.026) (0.03) (0.025) (0.028) (0.018) (0.03) (0.029) (0.015) (0.011) (0.03) (0.028) (0.027) 
advisor’s opinion -0.018 -0.066** 0.003 -0.046* -0.031* -0.013 0.04 -0.008 -0.011 0.065** 0.036 0.051* 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.027) (0.018) (0.029) (0.028) (0.015) (0.011) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) 
opinion many advisors 0.012 0.026 -0.013 -0.006 0.015 -0.005 -0.001 0.008 -0.001 -0.038 -0.035 -0.024 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.024) (0.026) (0.018) (0.028) (0.027) (0.015) (0.011) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) 
investment experience -0.069*** 0.023 -0.018 -0.06*** -0.009 -0.041* 0.072*** 0.023* 0.007 -0.005 -0.047** -0.042* 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.02) (0.022) (0.015) (0.024) (0.023) (0.012) (0.008) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) 
age 0.003** 0.004** -0.003* 0.003** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.001 0.000 -0.001** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
female 0.11*** -0.094** -0.022 0.051 -0.006 0.089** 0.073** 0.000 -0.011 0.067* 0.084** 0.139*** 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.031) (0.034) (0.023) (0.037) (0.036) (0.019) (0.014) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) 
high education 0.044 0.045 -0.048 -0.012 0.007 0.023 -0.069* 0.005 0.000 -0.010 -0.001 0.056 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.032) (0.035) (0.023) (0.038) (0.036) (0.02) (0.014) (0.038) (0.036) (0.034) 
income2 -0.08 -0.015 -0.031 0.136** 0.005 -0.028 0.146** -0.014 -0.005 0.026 -0.044 0.051 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.05) (0.058) (0.038) (0.065) (0.065) (0.03) (0.023) (0.064) (0.062) (0.061) 
income3 -0.184*** 0.023 -0.026 0.011 -0.009 -0.002 0.133* -0.048 -0.002 -0.025 -0.068 0.064 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.053) (0.062) (0.04) (0.068) (0.068) (0.032) (0.024) (0.067) (0.064) (0.063) 
income4 -0.414*** 0.122 -0.067 -0.103 -0.004 0.091 -0.044 -0.056* 0.02 -0.110 -0.226* -0.023 
 (0.142) (0.124) (0.093) (0.128) (0.08) (0.124) (0.123) (0.029) (0.056) (0.128) (0.133) (0.121) 
wealth2 0.037 0.019 -0.078** -0.009 0.007 -0.007 0.032 -0.023 -0.021 0.009 0.033 0.076* 
 (0.035) (0.046) (0.034) (0.042) (0.029) (0.047) (0.044) (0.021) (0.014) (0.046) (0.042) (0.044) 
wealth3 -0.012 0.016 -0.072 0.003 -0.009 -0.097 -0.014 -0.037 0.005 0.077 0.108* 0.006 
 (0.057) (0.07) (0.051) (0.063) (0.043) (0.073) (0.067) (0.027) (0.027) (0.069) (0.057) (0.066) 
wealth4 -0.04 0.167* -0.059 -0.029 -0.059 -0.044 0.085 -0.052* 0.017 -0.012 0.044 0.157 
 (0.085) (0.095) (0.077) (0.094) (0.046) (0.105) (0.102) (0.029) (0.042) (0.104) (0.089) (0.107) 
French-speaking 0.06* 0.092** -0.038 0.064 0.042 -0.022 -0.02 -0.037* 0.017 0.095** -0.01 0.1** 
 (0.034) (0.044) (0.036) (0.039) (0.03) (0.045) (0.043) (0.02) (0.02) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) 
Italian-speaking 0.089** -0.066 0.058 0.05 -0.015 0.133** 0.218*** 0.023 0.069* 0.057 0.127*** 0.108* 
 (0.041) (0.061) (0.053) (0.051) (0.036) (0.056) (0.061) (0.034) (0.037) (0.059) (0.049) (0.06) 
 
As expected, reliance on certain information sources significantly influences the risk of certain 
investment mistakes. We find that individuals who strongly rely on price movements as a source of 
information are more likely than others to trade on a random walk and to fall victim to the disposition 
effect. Individuals who follow media news are more likely to be informed about the past long-term 
returns of different asset classes. However, they are also at a greater risk of trading actively on a random 
walk. Individuals who rely on their friends’ opinions are more likely to hold only a few assets, whereas 
for individuals who rely on their own judgment, the opposite is the case. Individuals who strongly weight 
the opinion of their own advisors are more likely to be aware of the risks of assets in the short term and of 
the advantages of portfolio and time diversification. However, they are also more vulnerable to the 
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disposition effect. Hence, it is possible that individuals who rely on advisors learn to avoid some mistakes 
related to asset allocation but do not learn how to avoid mistakes in shifting their asset allocations over 
time.  
Individuals with higher self-reported levels of investment experience are indeed better than others at 
avoiding investment mistakes. More experienced individuals appear to be more familiar with the past 
returns of asset classes, show better knowledge about diversification, seem to avoid active trading in the 
presence of a random walk and show a better ability to avoid the disposition effect. However, they are 
also more likely to maintain investments for the wrong reasons and to bet on large but unlikely outcomes. 
The effects of demographic and socio-economic characteristics on the probability of specific investment 
errors are also worth noting, as some of these characteristics are often used as proxies for investor 
sophistication. We find that older individuals make more mistakes in answering questions about the risk-
return profiles of asset classes and diversification but that they are better informed than other respondents 
about potential performance drivers. The former group of respondents is also less likely to trade actively 
in the presence of a random walk, less likely to take risks after losses to try to break even and better able 
to avoid the disposition effect. Females are generally better than males at assessing the short-term risks 
associated with specific asset classes. However, they are also more likely to trade actively in the presence 
of a random walk, to maintain investments for the wrong reasons and to fall victim to the disposition 
effect. Individuals with higher education levels are less likely to maintain investments for the wrong 
reasons, but otherwise, higher education does not influence the probability of specific investment errors. 
The impact of income and wealth on the ability to avoid specific mistakes is limited. Interestingly, we 
observe significant regional differences; e.g., in answering many questions, French- and Italian-speaking 
individuals are more likely to make mistakes than are German-speaking individuals.  
Although we do not know whether individuals would truly behave as they indicated in their answers to 
our hypothetical questions, there are some similarities between our observations and the results of other 
studies of individuals’ actual trading behavior. Most often, these studies focus on the disposition effect 
and under-diversification. Regarding the disposition effect, we observe that younger, less experienced, 
female individuals, who rely strongly on price movements as a source of information, are more likely 
than others to fall victim to the disposition effect. Our findings regarding the effects of age and gender are 
consistent with the results of Cheng et al. (2013), who used data on investors in the Taiwan Futures 
Exchange. Our findings on the relevance of investment experience are consistent with the results of Dhar 
and Zhu (2006). Those researchers observe that investors who gain more investment experience through 
frequent trading are less vulnerable to the disposition effect. In comparing experienced investors and 
undergraduates students, Costa et al. (2013) find that both groups are subject to the disposition effect but 
that the experienced investors are less so. The relevance of price movements is indirectly observed by 
Weber and Camerer (1998). In an experimental study, Weber and Camerer find that individuals who 
make portfolio decisions that conform to the disposition effect ask for information about past price 
movements even though they have been told that price changes are independent over time.  
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In investigating the drivers of under-diversification, we find that older individuals are more likely to state 
that fewer than ten securities are sufficient to minimize portfolio risk. To the extent that a lack of 
knowledge drives under-diversification, we expect older individuals to hold less diversified portfolios. 
Calvet et al. (2009) study the portfolios of the entire Swedish population and find that older households 
are more likely to hold under-diversified portfolios. Furthermore, we observe that individuals who self-
identify as having more extensive investment experience are more likely than others to know that well-
diversified portfolios consist of more than ten stocks. In applying this knowledge, experienced investors 
should develop better-diversified portfolios than less experienced investors. This conjecture is consistent 
with the results of Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), who find that more sophisticated investors, i.e., more 
experienced investors, are better diversified.  
To consolidate our results on the drivers of investment mistakes, we use the index of investment 
competence as a dependent variable and estimate whether its value is related to the perceived importance 
of information sources, investment experience and certain demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics. The results are summarized in Table 9.  
Table 9: Drivers of Investment Competenece 
Panel A reports the mean value of variables in a sample with individuals with an investment competence below the average and 
in another sample with individuals with investment competence above the average. It includes p-values on one-side t-tests on the 
reported differences in the means. Panel B reports estimated marginal effects of three regressions. The first column of Panel B 
reports the marginal effects of a logistic regression on the probability to show high investment competence (investment 
competence that is above the average). The second and third columns report the marginal effects of OLS regressions on the index 
of investment mistakes using the whole sample respectively a subsample with one-person households. The explanatory variables 
are described in the appendix. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.  
Significance levels are denoted with stars: *** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Investment competence Investment competence 
 below 
average 
above 
average 
 one-sided t-test 
(p-value) 
1: above average 
0: below average  
subsample: 
1-person-households 
price movements 2.10! 2.03! 0.096 -0.054** (0.028) -0.042 (0.043) -0.092 (0.103) 
news in media 1.88! 1.91! 0.253 0.038 (0.031) 0.005 (0.051) 0.046 (0.130) 
friends’ opinion 1.81! 1.76! 0.098 -0.029 (0.029) 0.026 (0.047) 0.123 (0.122) 
own judgment 2.34! 2.34! 0.495 0.01 (0.031) -0.035 (0.050) 0.050 (0.112) 
own advisor’s opinion 2.07! 2.04! 0.248 -0.007 (0.030) 0.046 (0.048) 0.068 (0.109) 
many advisors’ opinion 1.81! 1.80! 0.366 0.029 (0.029) 0.001 (0.049) 0.055 (0.105) 
investment experience 2.19! 2.23! 0.259 -0.022 (0.025) 0.003 (0.043) 0.007 (0.106) 
age 47! 49! 0.002 0.005*** (0.002) 0.007** (0.003) 0.020*** (0.006) 
female 47%! 41%! 0.028 -0.069* (0.039) -0.130** (0.063) -0.116 (0.156) 
high education 47%! 52%! 0.076 0.058 (0.039) 0.027 (0.065) 0.080 (0.170) 
income 1 10% 7% 0.072    
income 2 44%! 44%! 0.471 0.043 (0.068) 0.016 (0.110) 0.153 (0.245) 
income 3 44%! 46%! 0.219 0.040 (0.071) 0.105 (0.112) 0.192 (0.254) 
income 4 2%! 2%! 0.419 0.002 (0.136) 0.220 (0.248) 0.047 (1.032) 
wealth 1 61% 56% 0.067    
wealth 2 18% 18% 0.499 -0.012 (0.048) 0.016 (0.080) -0.084 (0.180) 
wealth 3 6% 7% 0.272 0.034 (0.073) 0.011 (0.132) 0.029 (0.327) 
wealth 4 3% 4% 0.130 0.079 (0.103) 0.048 (0.162) 0.312 (0.322) 
German-speaking 65% 74% 0.001    
French-speaking 22%! 18%! 0.047 -0.062 (0.046) -0.090 (0.081) -0.046 (0.180) 
Italian-speaking 13%! 8%! 0.010 -0.151** (0.061) -0.355*** (0.110) -0.234 (0.217) 
c ! !   2.243*** (0.248) -3.629*** (0.621) 
N ! !  794 794 172 
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In Panel A, we present the differences between individuals with high and low investment competence in 
terms of how they weight the importance of different information sources, their indicated investment 
experience and some demographic and socio-economic characteristics. One-tailed two-sample t-tests are 
used to estimate the significance of the observed differences in the means. We find that individuals with 
lower investment competence consider price movements and friends’ recommendations to be 
significantly more important, on average, than do other individuals. These individuals are also likely to be 
young, French- or Italian-speaking and female and tend to have less education, income and wealth than 
other individuals.  
To estimate the impact of these variables on investment competence, we first conduct a logistic regression 
with a binomial variable that takes a value of 1 if investment competence is above average and a value of 
0 otherwise. The marginal effects on the probability of above- average investment competence as 
reported in the first column of Panel B show that older, male individuals and individuals who give 
relatively less weight to price movements are more likely than others to avoid making many investment 
mistakes. 
We also find that investment competence is characterized by significant age and gender gaps. The OLS 
regression estimates reported in the third column of Panel B suggest that younger, female individuals 
have significantly lower investment competence than others.  
The gender gap may be a function of the traditional division of household labor, in which women are less 
involved than men are in investment decision-making. To test this conjecture, we replicate the OLS 
analysis for a subsample of participants, those with only one person in the household. The results, which 
are reported in the last column of Panel B, show that in one-person households, men and women do not 
differ significantly in their ability to avoid investment errors. Hence, the low involvement of women in 
investment decision-making may indeed be responsible for the observed difference in investment 
competence.   
4.2 Investment Competence and Advice-Seeking 
In this section, while controlling for other relevant variables, we analyze the relationship between 
individuals’ investment competence and their propensity to make investment decisions autonomously, 
consult advisors and delegate decisions. Panel A of Table 10 shows the differences in the characteristics 
of individuals with differing degrees of willingness to delegate decisions. Panel B reports the marginal 
effects of partially proportional odds estimates on the probability of a person’s choosing one of the four 
delegation options.13 
 
 
 
                                                      
13 The estimation procedure is described in the appendix. 
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Table 10: Drivers of the Demand for Financial Advice 
Panel A reports the mean value of variables in four subsamples of individuals according to their propensity to delegate decisions. Panel B reports 
estimated marginal effects of a generalized ordered logit on the probabilities to choose one of the four options regarding delegation. The 
explanatory variables are described in the appendix. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.  
Significance levels are denoted with stars: *** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1.  
 
 Panel A Panel B 
 d1 d2 d3 d4 d1 d2 d3 d4 
investment competence -2.09 -1.98 -1.92 -1.87 "0.030**!(0.013) "0.013**!(0.006) 0.021**!(0.010) 0.022**!(0.010) 
price movements 2.05 2.16 2.06 1.85 0.008!(0.017) 0.004!(0.007) "0.006!(0.012) "0.006!(0.012) 
news in media 1.92 1.90 1.93 1.78 0.021!(0.018)! 0.01!(0.008)! "0.015!(0.013)! "0.016!(0.013)!
friends’ opinion 1.69 1.73 1.93 1.70 "0.072***!(0.023) "0.048*!(0.025) 0.137***!(0.027) "0.017!(0.018) 
own judgment 2.43 2.36 2.38 2.01 0.089***!(0.024) 0.009!(0.026) "0.012!(0.026) "0.085***!(0.019) 
own advisor’s opinion 1.71 2.19 1.98 2.48 "0.165***!(0.023) 0.081***!(0.022) "0.061**!(0.025) 0.145***!(0.018) 
many advisors’ opinion 1.56 1.85 1.89 1.86 "0.015!(0.018) "0.007!(0.008) 0.011!(0.013) 0.011!(0.013) 
investment experience 2.27 2.24 2.12 2.08 0.027*!(0.015) 0.012*!(0.007) "0.019*!(0.011) "0.020*!(0.011) 
age 46 50 48 50 "0.003***!(0.001) "0.001**!(0000) 0.002**!(0.001) 0.002***!(0.001) 
female 45% 44% 45% 49% 0.010!(0.024) 0.004!(0.010) "0.007!(0.017) "0.007!(0.017) 
higher education 48% 46% 51% 48% 0.000!(0.024) 0.000!(0.011) 0.000!(0.017) 0.000!(0.017) 
self-employment 9% 12% 8% 13% "0.017!(0.034) "0.008!(0.017) 0.012!(0.024) 0.013!(0.028) 
income 2 43% 51% 42% 46% "0.019!(0.041) "0.009!(0.019) 0.013!(0.029) 0.014!(0.030) 
income 3 33% 27% 33% 32% "0.054!(0.042) "0.025!(0.020) 0.038!(0.029) 0.041!(0.032) 
income 4 13% 14% 15% 12% "0.009!(0.080) "0.004!(0.039) 0.006!(0.056) 0.007!(0.063) 
wealth 2 17% 19% 18% 20% 0.004!(0.029) 0.002!(0.013) "0.003!(0.021) "0.003!(0.021) 
wealth 3 12% 15% 14% 19% "0.012!(0.042) "0.006!(0.021) 0.008!(0.030) 0.009!(0.034) 
wealth 4 3% 8% 5% 7% "0.015!(0.061) "0.007!(0.031) 0.011!(0.042) 0.012!(0.050) 
French-speaking 19% 17% 22% 23% "0.02!(0.027) "0.009!(0.014) 0.014!(0.019) 0.015!(0.022) 
Italian-speaking 12% 14% 8% 8% 0.066!(0.043) 0.023**!(0.011) "0.048!(0.032) "0.041*!(0.022) 
N        784 
Pseudo R2        0.1002 
 
We observe that on average, self-directed individuals have the lowest investment competence, whereas 
individuals who delegate decisions have the highest investment competence. The estimation results 
confirm this observation. The results show that investment competence positively influences the demand 
for financial advice. When investment competence increases, the probability of consulting several 
advisors and of delegating decisions increases, and the probability of making investment decisions 
autonomously and of consulting an advisor before making a final decision decreases.14  
Other interesting observations emerge from a comparison of the effects of different information sources. 
Individuals who rely strongly on the opinions of friends are more likely to consult several advisors, and 
those who rely less on their friends’ opinions are more likely to make investment decisions autonomously 
or to consult an advisor before making a decision. One’s own judgment as a source of information is 
important only with respect to whether one makes investment decisions autonomously or delegates such 
decisions. The greater (weaker) one’s reliance on one’s own judgment, the higher (lower) the probability 
that one will make one’s investment decisions autonomously (delegate decisions). Greater reliance on the 
opinions of one’s advisor increases the probability of a person’s consulting an advisor and delegating 
decisions and decreases the probability of that person’s making investment decisions autonomously and 
of seeking out many advisors. Investment experience increases the probability of a person’s making 
                                                      
14 This result remains qualitatively the same if we apply a multinomial logistic model. The latter neglects the fact that the 
dependent variable is ordered and treats the delegation decisions as independent categories.  
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investment decisions autonomously and consulting an advisor before making investment decisions and 
decreases the probability of that person’s consulting with several advisors and delegating decisions.  
In summary, self-directed individuals are more likely to be younger, have lower levels of investment 
competence, have greater investment experience and rely more on their own judgment and less on the 
opinions of their advisors and friends. Individuals who rely more on the opinions of advisors are more 
likely to consult an advisor before making an investment decision. Older individuals rely more on the 
advice of their friends and less on that of a single advisor, and they tend to have high investment 
competence but low investment experience. They are also more likely to seek the advice of several 
advisors. The probability of delegating decisions increases with investment competence, reliance on one’s 
own advisor and age. It decreases with stated investment experience and reliance on one’s own judgment.  
Gender, higher education, self-employment status, income and financial wealth appear to be unrelated to 
decisions to seek financial advice or to delegate financial decisions.  
Why, then, do some individuals with low investment competence make investment decisions 
autonomously? One reason may be their lack of self-awareness. As Kruger and Dunning (1999) suggest, 
less competent individuals are likely to lack the ability to recognize their own lack of competence. If 
awareness is reflected in reliance on one’s own judgment, then it appears that individuals with low 
investment competence tend to be unaware of their incompetence, as individuals with high and low 
investment competence rely equally strongly on their own judgment (see Table 9).  
An alternative explanation relates to regret aversion. For a regret-averse decision-maker, consulting an 
advisor or delegating decisions is risky because the advisor could reveal mistakes in the individual’s 
previous decisions. Such regret tends to be stronger for individuals who are more involved in the 
decision-making process (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). If we proxy involvement in the decision-
making process using the perceived importance of one’s own judgment as a source of information, we 
may conclude that self-directed individuals are most likely to feel regret because they rely most heavily 
on their own judgments (see Table 10).  
The same arguments can explain why advice seeking increases with investment competence. Individuals 
with higher levels of investment competence may also lack awareness of their abilities but may be less 
prone to regret in delegating decision because they are less involved in their investment decisions than are 
self-directed individuals. Additionally, it is possible that more competent individuals anticipate advisors’ 
incentives to reveal information, as suggested by Collins (2010), Calcagno and Monticone (2011) and 
Bucher-Koenen and Koenen (2011), or that they consume more advisory services because of their lower 
marginal costs of information processing (Bluethgen et al., 2008).     
4.3 Learning from Advisors 
The fact that individuals with higher investment competence are more likely to consult with advisors and 
delegate decisions does not necessarily indicate the direction of causality within that relationship. 
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Individuals with higher levels of investment competence may consult with advisors to learn from them 
rather than to rely on their advisors’ recommendations.  
To shed light on this issue, we focus on individuals who are likely to learn from their advisors. We 
consider two sub-samples: one that includes all individuals who do not make investment decisions 
autonomously (i.e., those who consult one or several advisors or who delegate decisions) and one that 
includes all individuals who consult one or several advisors. We then test whether investment competence 
is related to the perceived importance of advisors’ recommendations given the assumption that 
individuals who learn from their advisors attach greater importance to their advisors’ recommendations 
than do individuals who do not. The results are summarized in Table 11. 
Table 11: Investment Competence and Learning 
The table reports marginal effects of OLS-regressions on the level of investment competence with a subsample of individuals 
consulting one or several advisors and a subsample of individuals with individuals choosing to consult one or several advisors or 
delegate decisions. The explanatory variables are described in the appendix. The explanatory variables are described in the 
appendix. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
Significance levels are denoted with stars: *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. 
 
 Investment competence 
 Subsample: d2, d3 Subsample: d2, d3, d4 
price movements -0.042 (0.053) -0.055 (0.045) 
news in media -0.007 (0.061) -0.031 (0.054) 
friends’ opinion -0.028 (0.059) -0.029 (0.050) 
own judgment 0.028 (0.064) -0.001 (0.055) 
own advisor’s opinion -0.021 (0.063) 0.011 (0.051) 
many advisors’ opinion 0.020 (0.063) 0.002 (0.052) 
investment experience -0.033 (0.055) -0.022 (0.047) 
age 0.003 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 
female -0.195** (0.082) -0.210*** (0.069) 
higher education 0.141* (0.084) 0.136* (0.070) 
income 2 0.010 (0.147) -0.035 (0.125) 
income 3 0.070 (0.148) 0.002 (0.128) 
income 4 0.392 (0.276) 0.281 (0.246) 
wealth 2 -0.021 (0.107) -0.021 (0.088) 
wealth 3 0.138 (0.141) 0.073 (0.131) 
wealth 4 -0.121 (0.229) -0.076 (0.200) 
French-speaking -0.067 (0.103) -0.101 (0.087) 
Italian-speaking -0.357** (0.154) -0.348*** (0.125) 
c -1.919*** (0.32) -1.767*** (0.276) 
N 486 619 
R2 0.0600 0.0572 
 
We do not find that individuals’ investment competence is related to their reliance on their advisors in 
any of the subsamples. There is also no evidence that individuals learn from advisors but they tend to 
attribute the positive achievements resulting from this learning to their own ability. The relationship 
between the perceived importance of one’s own opinion and one’s level of investment competence is very 
weak and is statistically insignificant. We conclude that learning from advisors is most likely not related 
to the observed positive relationship between investment competence and delegation.    
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5 Robustness Tests 
As discussed in Section 3.2, our index of investment competence is constructed using the weighted sums 
of investment mistakes. A higher (lower) penalty is assigned for an incorrect answer when a larger 
proportion of the respondents answer the question correctly (incorrectly). 
As a robustness check, we estimate the relationship between investment competence and the propensity to 
seek and rely on advice under alternative specifications for the investment competence index. The first 
index of investment competence uses the sums of the respondents’ investment mistakes. The next two 
indices introduce weights for some questions to account for their relatively high correlations with other 
questions. Table 12 reports these estimation results, which show that the effect of investment 
incompetence remains qualitatively unchanged. 
Table 12: Robustness Tests on Index Construction 
The table reports the marginal effect of alternative investment competence indices on the probability to choose one of the options 
regarding delegation in generalized logit regressions. The repressors (not reported here) are the same as in Table 10. Robust 
standards errors are included in parenthesis. Significance levels are denoted with stars: *** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1.  
The indices are specified as follows: Index&(basis) = −(!!!! +⋯+ !!!!!!);  Index&1 = −(!! +⋯+ !!!); Index&2&=& − !! +⋯+ !!"!!!!! ; Index&3&=& − !! − !! +⋯+ !!"!!!!! . 
 
 d1 d2 d3 d4 
Investment competence index (basis)  -0.030** (0.013) -0.013** (0.006) 0.021** (0.010) 0.022** (0.010) 
Investment competence index 1 -0.014* (0.007) -0.006* (0.003) 0.010* (0.005) 0.010* (0.005) 
Investment competence index 2 -0.017** (0.008) -0.008** (0.075) 0.013** (0.006) 0.013** (0.006) 
Investment competence index 3 -0.016** (0.008) -0.007** (0.003) 0.011** (0.005) 0.012** (0.006) 
 
One might argue that for individuals with low investment competence, autonomous investment decisions 
are not costly because such individuals do not participate in the financial markets, and thus, their 
investment mistakes appear only “on paper.” To test this conjecture, we use stated investment experience 
as a proxy for participation in the financial markets and re-estimate the impact of investment competence 
on advice seeking by excluding all individuals without investment experience. Table 13 reports the 
marginal effects of investment competence on the probability of choosing one of the delegation options 
within this particular subsample. Clearly, the effects of investment competence and of the control 
variables on the probability of delegating decisions are qualitatively the same as in the full sample. We 
conclude that if individuals do not learn from their experience, the “paper mistakes” that they make when 
answering our questions are likely to materialize in the real world unless they delegate their decisions.  
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Table 13: Robustness Test on a Subsample with Investment Experience 
The table reports marginal effects on the probability to choose one of the options regarding delegation in a generalized logit regression on a 
subsample excluding individuals stating no investment experience with any asset class. The explanatory variables are described in the appendix. 
Robust standards errors are included in parenthesis. Significance levels are denoted with stars: *** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1.  
 
 d1 d2 d3 d4 
Investment competence "0.029**!(0.014) "0.020**!(0.009) 0.031**!(0.014) 0.018**!(0.009) 
price movements "0.002!(0.017) "0.001!(0.012) 0.002!(0.018) 0.001!(0.011) 
news in media 0.019!(0.019)! 0.013!(0.013)! "0.02!(0.020)! "0.012!(0.012)!
friends’ opinion "0.046**!(0.023) "0.075***!(0.027) 0.144***!(0.030) "0.023!(0.017) 
own judgment 0.083***!(0.002) 0.056***!(0.015) "0.087***!(0.022) "0.052***!(0.013) 
own advisor’s opinion "0.165***!(0.023) 0.082***!(0.025) "0.054*!(0.029) 0.136***!(0.017) 
many advisors’ opinion "0.013!(0.018) "0.009!(0.012) 0.014!(0.019) 0.008!(0.011) 
investment experience 0.033*!(0.017) 0.022*!(0.012) "0.034*!(0.018) "0.02*!(0.011) 
age "0.002**!(0.001) "0.001*!(0.001) 0.002**!(0.001) 0.001**!(0.001) 
female 0.032!(0.025) 0.021!(0.016) "0.033!(0.026) "0.019!(0.015) 
higher education 0.009!(0.025) 0.006!(0.017) "0.01!(0.026) "0.006!(0.016) 
self-employment 0.016!(0.037) 0.01!(0.022) "0.017!(0.038) "0.010!(0.020) 
income 2 "0.003!(0.048) "0.002!(0.033) 0.003!(0.051) 0.002!(0.030) 
income 3 "0.025!(0.049) "0.017!(0.034) 0.026!(0.052) 0.015!(0.031) 
income 4 "0.012!(0.077) "0.009!(0.058) 0.013!(0.082) 0.008!(0.054) 
wealth 2 0.005!(0.029) 0.003!(0.019) "0.005!(0.031) "0.003!(0.018) 
wealth 3 0.028!(0.046) 0.017!(0.024) "0.029!(0.047) "0.016!(0.023) 
wealth 4 0.006!(0.062) 0.004!(0.039) "0.006!(0.065) "0.004!(0.037) 
French-speaking 0.015!(0.033) 0.009!(0.020) "0.015!(0.034) "0.009!(0.019) 
Italian-speaking 0.036!(0.043) 0.021!(0.021) "0.037!(0.043) "0.020!(0.021) 
N    629 
Pseudo R2    0.1070 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we assess the extent to which individuals in Switzerland are at risk of making investment 
mistakes and the likelihood that investors will seek help from professional advisors. We find that 
younger, female individuals show significantly less ability to avoid investment mistakes than do other 
individuals and that individuals who rely less on price movements as a source of information about 
investments are more likely than others to avoid making many mistakes simultaneously. Regarding the 
demand for financial advice, we find that individuals with lower investment competence but a higher 
stated level of investment experience and a stronger reliance on their own judgment are more likely than 
others to make investments decisions autonomously. This result is robust to alternative specifications of 
investment competence and to the use of subsamples that exclude individuals who are unlikely to 
participate in financial markets. It thus appears that the individuals who are most in need of financial 
advice are those who are least likely to seek it out and rely on it.  
This finding has important implications for initiatives that are intended to promote investment 
competence among retail investors. Our results suggest that, in Switzerland, younger, Italian-speaking 
and female individuals would benefit most from such programs. The gender gap with regard to 
investment competence appears to be a result of the low level of involvement of women in investment 
decision-making. Hence, specific measures should be used to promote investment competence among 
women. Our results also suggest that such programs need to clarify the relevance of information about 
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price movements, as we find that individuals who rely less on such information are more likely than 
others to avoid making many investment mistakes simultaneously.  
Overall, this study indicates that it is difficult for financial advisors to reach the people who most need 
financial advice. On the other hand, letting self-directed individuals learn “by doing” may not be 
effective, as some mistakes are not easy to identify (Koestner et al., 2012). Learning by doing in this 
context is also irrational, as people tend to overweight their own experience relative to broader patterns of 
evidence. Hence, if the aim is to develop methods of correcting widespread investment mistakes among 
individuals, additional research should be undertaken to cultivate a better understanding of the conditions 
under which people learn from their mistakes, determine the limits of their abilities and thus seek 
professional help. 
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Appendix 
Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
investment competence Index of investment competence 
investment experience Index of investment experience based on experience statements with asset classes 
female dummy variable: 1: female 
higher education dummy variable: 1: school of applied sciences or university 
self-employment dummy variable: 1: status is self-employment 
age ordinal variable: number of years 
bonds world ordinal variable: experience with international bonds investments (1: no experience - 4: high) 
Swiss bonds ordinal variable: experience with Swiss bonds investments (1: no experience - 4: high) 
equity world ordinal variable: experience with international equity investments (1: no experience - 4: high) 
Swiss equity ordinal variable: experience with Swiss equity investments (1: no experience - 4: high) 
alternative investments ordinal variable: experience with alternative investments (1: no experience - 4: high) 
price movements ordinal variable: perceived importance of price movements (1: not important - 3: very important) 
news in media ordinal variable: perceived importance of media news (1: not important - 3: very important) 
friends’ opinion ordinal variable: perceived importance of friends’ opinion (1: not important - 3: very important) 
own judgment ordinal variable: perceived importance of own judgment (1: not important - 3: very important) 
opinion own advisor ordinal variable: perceived importance of the own advisor (1: not important - 3: very important) 
opinion many advisors ordinal variable: perceived importance of the opinion of many advisors (1: not important - 3: very important) 
income 1 dummy variable: 1: net disposable income in the household ≤ 50’000 Swiss francs  
income 2 dummy variable: 1: net disposable income in the household between 50’000 and 100’000 Swiss francs 
income 3 dummy variable: 1: net disposable income in the household between 100’000 and 150’000 Swiss francs 
income 4 dummy variable: 1: net disposable income in the household above 150’000 Swiss francs 
wealth 1 dummy variable: 1: financial wealth below 100’000 Swiss francs 
wealth 2 dummy variable: 1: financial wealth between 100’000 and 200’000 Swiss francs 
wealth 3 dummy variable: 1: financial wealth between 200’000 and 300’000 Swiss francs 
wealth 4 dummy variable: 1: financial wealth above 300’000 Swiss francs 
German-speaking dummy variable: 1: residence in a German-speaking region 
French-speaking dummy variable: 1: residence in a French-speaking region 
Italian-speaking dummy variable: 1: residence in an Italian-peaking region 
Qk dummy variables for k investment competence questions: 1: answer indicating an investment mistake 
d1 dummy variable: 1: “I prefer to decide autonomously, the advisor should only execute my decision” 
d2 dummy variable: 1: “I prefer to tell my advisor how I would decide and would ask for his opinion” 
d3 dummy variable: 1: “I prefer to get several opinions before I decide” 
d4 dummy variable: 1: “I would trust my advisor in most decisions” 
d5 dummy variable: 1: “I would let my advisor decide everything” 
 
Investment Competence Questions 
 
Q1. Considering a long-term time period  (e.g. 30 years), which assets normally give the highest return? 
a) cash b) gold c) bonds d) real estate financial investments e) stocks f) hedge funds g) private equity 
Q2. Normally, which assets display the highest risk in the short-term  (e.g. 1-2 years)?  
a) cash b) gold c) bonds d) real estate financial investments e) stocks f) hedge funds g) private equity 
Q3. Investment success depends on several sources. Which of the following has the strongest 
contribution? 
a) long-term allocation of wealth over several asset classes b) over- and underweighting of asset classes in 
the short-term c)  security selection within asset classes 
Q4. How many single stocks are needs to achieve a good dispersion of risk?  
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a) 1-5 stocks b) 5-10 stocks c) more than 10 stocks 
Q5. If one assumes that the average return on the Swiss stock market is 5% per year, then the probability 
for a loss after one year is 40%. What is the probability for a loss after 5 years?  
a) 40% or more b) less than 40% c) I cannot make such estimation 
Q6. Suppose that the market price of a stock moves randomly and in more than half of the cases it goes 
up. Which strategy would you prefer?  
a) I buy and hold the stock until I need the money b) I buy, wait until I made a certain gain, and then I sell 
and buy again at a lower price. 
Q7. Suppose you bought a financial asset. Which of the following factors do you consider as most 
important for you to stay invested, i.e. keep the asset?  
a) that I made a gain with asset b) that the asset follows a positive trend at the moment c) that the 
investment idea still holds true d) I cannot decide because I have no investment experience with financial 
assets. 
Q8. Suppose you want to invest a large portion of your wealth for 1-2 years. Which of the following 
investments appear more attractive to you?  
a) asset A offering a chance to win 10’000 Swiss franks in 50 out of 100 cases b) asset B offering a 
chance to win 50’000 Swiss franks in 10 out of 100 cases c) both assets are equally attractive 
Q9. How do you assess the correctness of the following rule: “After large losses one should take more 
risks in order to compensate for the losses”  
a) always true b) often true c) sometimes true d) never true e) I cannot decide 
Q10. Suppose you bought a financial asset for 100 Swiss franks. The current market price of the asset is 
80 Swiss franks. What would you do?  
a) I would buy more because the asset costs less b) I would sell because I made a loss c) I would not sell 
because otherwise I have to realize a loss d) I would reconsider the investment idea. 
Q11. Suppose you bought a financial asset at 100 Swiss franks. The current market price of the asset is 
150 Swiss franks. What would you do?  
a) I would realize the gain, i.e. I would sell the asset b) I would buy more because I made a gain c) I 
would reconsider the investment idea.  
Questions’ Background 
The first two questions are designed to assess the risk-reward perceptions of households. These questions 
ask households to compare asset classes in terms of long-term returns and short-term risk. Incorrect 
answers to these questions may be linked to the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). 
Because recent returns and losses are easily remembered, these may dominate overall risk-reward 
perceptions, with adverse consequences for trading decisions. For example, observing assets that have 
appreciated in the recent past may suggest that such assets are good long-term investments. On the other 
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hand, investing in an asset with long-term return potential without awareness of its potential for short-
term losses increases a person’s risk of abandoning it too early.  
The availability heuristic may also impact the perceived importance of performance drivers (Question 3). 
Because news media typically report the successes or failures of single securities and highlight shifts in 
the attractiveness of different asset classes, households may overweight such short-term phenomena in 
long-term asset allocation. However, Griffin and Xu (2009) suggest that even professional hedge fund 
managers may not exhibit superior skill at timing the market and selecting individual securities. 
Question 4 is used to evaluate households’ knowledge about the number of stocks that is necessary to 
achieve good portfolio diversification. A lack of such knowledge may explain why individuals hold 
under-diversified portfolios.  
Question 5 is used to assess households’ perception of the risk of long-term investments with returns 
following a random walk based on their knowledge of time diversification. If households know that the 
probability of loss decreases with the time horizon of an investment, then high turnover is most likely 
driven by other factors than knowledge (e.g., overconfidence). 
Question 6 addresses a type of trading behavior that is known as probability matching (see Vulkan, 2000 
for a review). The question assesses whether, given a random walk with positive drift, individuals prefer 
an active trading strategy to a passive buy-and-hold strategy.  
Question 7 is used to evaluate reasons for maintaining an investment. From a portfolio perspective, 
holding a stock that has appreciated in market value or has followed a positive trend is equivalent to 
taking on more risk. Depending on the investment idea, such risk-taking behavior can be optimal. 
However, holding an asset because it has appreciated in value or because it has exhibited a positive trend 
can be suboptimal. For example, holding an asset because its value has increased can be linked to self-
attribution bias (Kukla, 1972). Under this bias, past gains are perceived as evidence of the validity of 
one’s decision to buy the asset, whereas past losses are seen as resulting from bad luck. Due to the 
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973), households may follow trends. Although 
momentum investing is considered a legitimate strategy in the practitioner literature, evidence suggests 
that individual investors who buy equities that have recently outperformed the market and expect that this 
momentum will continue tend to obtain significantly inferior results (Pettengill et al., 2006). 
Under the assumption that households are risk averse, Question 8 is used to evaluate whether households 
overweight small probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), showing a preference for investing in 
assets with potentially high but unlikely gains over investing in other assets with the same expected 
returns.  
Question 9 is used to assess households’ awareness of their budget constraints in taking additional risks 
after losses in an effort to break even. The last two questions are used to assess households’ tendency to 
sell winners and hold losers in accordance with the disposition effect. 
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Empirical Estimation Strategy 
The delegation decisions are sorted into four levels ! of increasing severity of delegation. The ordered 
nature of the delegation choice suggests the use of ordered regression techniques to explain it.  
An ordered logit model is used to estimate the probability ! that the delegation choice of individual will 
take the value j = 1,..,M where M is the number of delegation choices, ! !! > ! = ! !! − !!! = exp!(!! − !!!)1 + exp!(!! − !!!) ! , ! = 1,… ,! − 1 
where !! and ! are the parameters to be estimated and where !! is a vector of explanatory variables.  
A critical assumption of the ordered model is that the slope coefficients do not vary across different 
choice categories except at the cut-off points !!. Hence, a change in a covariate is expected to have the 
same effect on all delegation choices. 
This parallel-lines assumption can be violated in many cases. A generalized ordered logit model can be 
specified to relax the parallel-lines assumption for all variables (see Boes and Winkelmann, 2006). In the 
generalized ordered logit model, the probability of a particular delegation choice is given by ! !! > ! = ! !! − !!!! = exp!(!! − !!!!)1 + exp!(!! − !!!!) ! , ! = 1,… ,! − 1 
Hence, in the generalized logit model, the slope coefficients !! may vary across equations, i.e., the 
relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable may depend on the choice 
category !. 
Given that the parallel-lines assumption may be violated by one variable or by multiple variables, we use 
the partial proportional odds model suggested by Peterson and Harrell (1990).15 The model is a special 
instance of the generalized ordered model in which one or more coefficients differ across equations and 
others can be the same for all equations. Relaxing the assumption for those variables that violate the 
parallel-lines assumption makes this model more efficient than the generalized ordered model. 
Using Wald tests, we find that at a 5% level of significance, the parallel-lines assumption is violated for 
the statements regarding the importance of friends’ and advisors’ opinions and for statements regarding 
the importance of one’s own judgment. For the rest of the variables, we assume that the estimated 
coefficients do not depend on the choice category !. 
The probability that the delegation choice will take the value !! = !1, . . ,! is given as follows ! !! = 1 = 1 − ! !! − !!!!  ! !! = ! = ! !!!! − !!!!!! − ! !! − !!!! , ! = 2,… ,! − 1 ! !! = ! = ! !!!! − !!!!!!  
 
 
                                                      
15 To estimate the regression model, we apply the “gologit2” routine in the software package Stata. 
